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Abstract We study an intertemporal model of committee decision-making where
members differ in their levels of efficiency. They may acquire costly information that
enhances their ability to make a correct decision. We focus on the impact of transpar-
ency. We show that the principal’s initial utility is higher under transparency, because
members exert more effort, which makes correct decisions more likely. The principal
also benefits from transparency later, unless transparency leads to an alignment of the
signal qualities of highly efficient and less efficient committee members. In general,
committee members are harmed by transparency. Together with the insights from the
literature, our results may help to decide when transparency in committees is desirable.
Keywords Committees · Career concerns · Experts · Transparency ·
Information acquisition
JEL Classification D71
1 Introduction
Many important economic and political issues are decided by committees whose indi-
viduals have particular expertise. Company boards or monetary policy committees are
examples in the economic realm. Parliamentary committees, the Council of Ministers
in the European Union, or constitutional courts are examples in the political area.
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Arguably, many of the decisions taken in these examples are complex, and mem-
bers of the committee have to exert effort prior to meetings in order to thoroughly
understand and evaluate the issues at hand. Hence the amount of information acquired
by members is crucial for the quality of the committee’s decision.
One recent phenomenon is that a variety of committee decision-making bodies
are becoming more transparent by publishing deliberations and individual votes.1 In
this paper we examine how transparency about the behavior of committee members
impacts on the amount of information acquired by them and, accordingly, on the
quality of decision-making in committees.
We analyze a two-period model. In each period, a committee of experts takes a
decision whose quality affects the utility of a principal (such as the parliament, share-
holders, ministers, etc.). The main ingredients of the model are that each committee
member (he) has to exert effort to acquire information about the correctness of a deci-
sion and that members are heterogeneous in how effort translates into the likelihood
of obtaining correct information. The principal (she) cannot observe committee mem-
bers’ types directly. To improve committee decision-making, the principal would like
members to exert high effort. Moreover, she aims at improving the composition of the
committee over time.
Committee members are motivated by career concerns. It is plausible that mem-
bers are concerned about their prestige and the satisfaction gained by working on the
committee and thus, in turn, about their re-appointment prospects. The desire to be
re-appointed creates incentives to acquire information, as the principal will tend to
re-appoint only those members who display higher quality in decision-making than
the average in the pool of potential experts.
The principal has two means of interfering with the workings of the committee.
First, she can choose either opaque or transparent voting at the beginning of the game.
When the principal opts for transparency, she can evaluate the quality of a member by
observing the individual’s decisions. When the principal decides to have an opaque
committee, she observes the collective decision alone. Second, after the committee
has made its decision in the first period, she can re-appoint members or replace them
by new experts.
Our main insights are as follows. First, we show that under transparency the princi-
pal is always better off in the first period, because transparency induces higher effort on
behalf of committee members and thus improves decision-making in the first period.
Second, the principal also benefits from transparency in the second period, unless
the higher effort levels induced by transparency lead to a strong alignment of the
signal qualities of highly efficient and less efficient members. Under transparency, the
principal can observe individual votes, which, for given effort levels, makes it easier
to identify the individual competency of members. If, however, the increases in effort
levels induced by transparency lead to a strong convergence of the qualities of mem-
bers’ signals, then it becomes difficult to distinguish between highly efficient members
and less efficient ones. We identify a critical property that guarantees that the principal
1 Examples are the Federal Open Market Committee, the U.S. Supreme Court, or the Monetary Policy
Committee of the Bank of England.
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benefits from transparency in the second period. We also provide a counterexample in
which the principal’s second-period utility is higher under opacity.
Third, we generalize our findings to the case where experts do not know their own
abilities. In this set-up, transparency is superior to opacity for the principal under all
circumstances.
Fourth, we show that transparency makes committee members worse off, because
they have to invest more in effort and their re-appointment chances are lower. This
might explain a certain initial reluctance on the part of various committees to make
their decision-making transparent. For example, the FOMC did not adopt transparent
decision-making voluntarily.
Fifth, we explore how the first and second insight are influenced by several factors.
In particular, we consider alternative assumptions on how effort translates into the
quality of an individual’s signal, pre-meetings, committee size, and the case where
the principal has no information regarding the quality of the decision. Overall, the
beneficial effects of transparency survive these extensions.
In Sect. 9, taking the findings of this paper and the existing literature into account,
we will draw a more general conclusion. We elaborate on the circumstances under
which transparency is beneficial to committee designers and those under which it is
not.
Our paper combines two strands of literature. The first is concerned with the impact
of transparency requirements on the quality of committee decision-making if the abil-
ities of members are exogenously given.2 This literature has shown that transparency
may distort the behavior of individual committee members, because they are not only
interested in the impact of their vote on the outcome of decision-making but attempt
to use their vote as a signal of a particular type. This effect is taken into account in
Fingleton and Raith (2005), Gersbach and Hahn (2008), Levy (2007), Sibert (2003),
and Stasavage (2007).3 In our model, for a given signal of a member, the vote that
maximizes a member’s reputation also maximizes the principal’s utility. Thus the
distortionary effect of transparency studied in these papers does not occur. Addi-
tional effects have been identified in the literature on transparency and committee
decision-making. Sibert (2003) analyzes the impact of transparent decision-making
on reputation-building if central bankers may have an incentive to increase output
above the natural rate. Levy (2007) shows that opaque decision-making induces mem-
bers to comply with pre-existing biases, as the signaling incentives in such cases are
not eliminated. The disadvantage of secrecy can be obviated if appropriate voting
rules are used. Gersbach and Hahn (2008) identify an intertemporal trade-off between
transparency and opacity. While secrecy initially makes for better decisions because
uninformed committee members have no incentive to mimic informed members, it
hampers the principal’s ability to dismiss manifestly less well-informed members.
2 Holmström (1982) is a seminal contribution to the literature on experts motivated by career concerns.
Other important contributions include Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Trueman (1994), and Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2001).
3 Visser and Swank (2007) present another interesting model where experts derive utility from being per-
ceived as competent. Prat (2005) examines transparency for a career concern model with one individual
expert.
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The second strand of literature is concerned with information acquisition and voting
in committees.4 Gersbach (1995) studies agents’ incentives to acquire information if
decisions are made by majority rule. He characterizes situations where the committee
acts as if it were fully informed and where this is preferred to ignorance by a major-
ity of members or the whole committee. Mukhopadhaya (2003) and Persico (2004)
examine the role of committee size for incentives to acquire information. Both find
that large committees lead to a severe underprovision of information.5 Gerardi and
Yariv (2008) study the optimal committee size and decision rule. We examine here
how the incentives to acquire information interact with the transparency regime when
members have career concerns.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2 we outline our model. We analyze
the equilibrium in the second period for transparency and opacity in Sect. 3. Subse-
quently, in Sects. 4 and 5, we derive the equilibria under transparency and opacity.
We compare the utility under transparency and under opacity for the principal and the
committee members in Sect. 6. In Sect. 7, we analyze our model for the alternative
assumption that experts do not know their own abilities. The robustness of our findings
and additional extensions to our model are discussed in Sect. 8. Section 9 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a two-period model of a committee comprising N experts (N > 1). For
simplicity of exposition we assume that N is odd. Committee members make a deci-
sion dt ∈ {−1,+1} by majority rule in each period t = 1, 2. We use dit ∈ {−1,+1}
to denote the individual vote of member i (i = 1, . . . , N ).
Committee members are appointed by a principal who benefits if the commit-
tee reaches a decision that corresponds to the state of the world, which is given by
st ∈ {−1,+1}. The principal has the following utility function in each period t = 1, 2:
u Pt =
{
1 if dt = st
0 if dt = st . (1)
Without loss of generality, we have normalized the principal’s benefits from a correct
decision to 1. We assume that nature chooses st = −1 and st = 1 with equal proba-
bility. The state of the world is unknown to the principal at the beginning of period t .
However, it becomes common knowledge after the committee has made its decision.
There is a common discount factor δ for the principal and experts.
There are two types of experts, highly efficient experts and less efficient experts.
We assume that the level of efficiency is private information. The prior probability
of an expert being highly efficient amounts to q H (0 < q H < 1). The probability
for the less efficient type is denoted by q L = 1 − q H . Each expert i may invest
effort eit ∈ [0, E] (E > 0) into information acquisition about the state of the world.
4 For a survey of this literature see Gerling et al. (2005).
5 As a member benefits from information acquisition by others, this is a classical team-work problem of
the kind discussed by Marschak and Radner (1972).
123
Information acquisition and transparency in committees 431
The effort of experts is unobservable to the principal. Each expert i then receives a
signal σ it ∈ {−1,+1} about the state of the world. The quality of the signal depends
on the expert’s type and on the effort exerted by him. For highly efficient experts, the
signal is correct with probability pH (eit ); with probability 1 − pH (eit ) the signal is
incorrect. A less efficient expert has a probability pL(eit ) of receiving a correct signal.
Thus the effort in period t only affects the quality of the signal in the same period.
The probability of an individual expert receiving a correct signal is independent of
whether other experts have received correct or incorrect signals.
We make the following assumptions about pH : [0, E] →]1/2, 1] and pL :
[0, E] →]1/2, 1]:
pH (eit ) > pL(eit )
∂pH
∂eit
(eit ) ≥ ∂p
L
∂eit
(eit ) ∀eit ∈ [0, E[,
∂pX
∂eit
(eit ) > 0
∂2 pX
∂(eit )
2 (e
i
t ) < 0 ∀eit ∈ [0, E[,∀X ∈ {H, L},
limeit →E
∂pX
∂eit
(eit ) <
1
δB limeit →0
∂pX
∂eit
(eit ) = ∞ ∀X ∈ {H, L},
where parameter B > 0 will be explained below.
Hence we assume that experts with high efficiency have a higher probability of
obtaining a correct signal for a given level of effort. Moreover, a marginal increase in
effort results in a weakly higher increase in the precision of the signal for highly
efficient members over and against less efficient members. The assumptions on
limeit →E
∂pX
∂eit
(eit ) and limeit →0
∂pX
∂eit
(eit ) are made for analytical convenience and guar-
antee the existence of interior solutions.
We assume that experts obtain utility from being on the committee. These benefits
amount to B > 0 in each period. Benefits B may comprise wages. They may also
be affected by the prestige and satisfaction involved in working on the committee.
Moreover, experts incur costs from exerting effort. If they do not hold office, utility is
normalized to 0. The utility of an expert in period t is given by
uit =
{
B − eit if the expert is on the committee
0 if the expert is not on the committee.
(2)
We assume B > E , i.e. an expert prefers to be a committee member even if he exerts
the maximum level of effort E .
The sequence of events is as follows:
Period 0
• The principal decides on the transparency regime.
Period 1
• The principal appoints committee members from a pool of candidates.
• Nature chooses the state of the world.
• Experts may invest in information acquisition.
• Experts receive private signals about the state of the world.
• Experts vote simultaneously.
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• Under transparency, individual voting records (di1)Ni=1 are published. Under opac-
ity, only the decision d1 becomes known.
Period 2
• The principal observes s1 and may either re-appoint each committee member or
replace him by a new member from a pool of candidates.
• The remaining events are identical to those described for period 1.6
We will identify perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game. Thus each member’s
effort levels and votes must be optimal, given the principal’s re-appointment scheme
and the other members’ decisions. Moreover, the principal’s re-appointment scheme
must be optimal, given the behaviors of committee members. We introduce several
plausible equilibrium refinements. Later we will show that perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibria satisfying these refinements actually exist.
First, we introduce the following tie-breaking rule: experts vote in line with their
signals if they are indifferent between votes. For example, this refinement rules out
implausible equilibria under opacity where all members always vote for the same
decision irrespective of their signal. No profitable deviation would exist in this case,
as all experts would never be pivotal.
Second, we make the assumption that re-appointment probabilities are symmet-
ric in the following sense. Under transparency, the probability of re-appointment
depends only on the correctness of the individual vote, where we call an individual vote
correct if di1 = s1. Under opacity, the re-appointment probability depends only on the
correctness of the committee decision, i.e. on whether d1 = s1 holds or not. Thus we
use μiT (Z
i ) (Zi ∈ {C, W }) to denote the probability of an expert being re-appointed
under transparency if he has made a correct (Zi = C) or a wrong (Zi = W ) deci-
sion (μiT (Z
i ) ∈ [0, 1]).7 Similarly, we introduce μiO(Z) (Z ∈ {C, W }) to denote the
re-appointment probability of expert i if the committee has made the correct (C) or
the wrong (W ) decision.
Third, we assume that the re-appointment scheme does not punish members for
correct individual votes under transparency and for correct committee decisions under
opacity. Formally, this refinement can be stated as
μiT (C) ≥ μiT (W ) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., N }, (3)
μiO(C) ≥ μiO(W ) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . ., N }. (4)
It excludes implausible equilibria where experts deliberately make wrong decisions
in order to signal high ability.
6 We assume that the states of the world are stochastically independent across periods.
7 In principle, a member’s probability of re-appointment could also depend on the other members’ votes.
Such behavior could be optimal to the principal only if she were indifferent between dismissing and
re-appointing the respective member. It can be shown that our implicit assumption that other members’
votes do not affect a member’s re-appointment probability does not affect our findings.
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3 Behavior of experts in the second period
The behavior of experts in the second period does not depend on the transparency
regime. It is obvious that experts will never exert effort in the second period, i.e.
eH2 = eL2 = 0 holds. Thus the utility of an expert holding office in the second period
amounts to ui2 = B. We summarize this finding in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Under transparency and opacity, experts choose effort levels ei2 = 0 in the
second period.
It will be useful to introduce P(p1, p2, . . ., pN ) as the probability of the committee
reaching a correct decision if each individual member i ∈ {1, . . ., N } makes a correct
decision with probability pi and if pi is independent of whether other experts make a
correct decision or not.8 Importantly, P(p1, p2, . . ., pN ) is strictly increasing in all of
its arguments for pi ∈ ] 0, 1[ ∀i ∈ {1, . . ., N }, as each member is pivotal with strictly
positive probability for pi ∈ ] 0, 1[ ∀i ∈ {1, . . ., N }.
According to the tie-breaking rule introduced in Sect. 2, experts always vote in line
with their private signals in the second period. This implies that the probability of a
highly efficient expert voting correctly amounts to pH (0). The respective probability
for a less efficient expert amounts to pL(0). Recall that our assumptions about pX (eit )
imply that the probability of an expert choosing the correct vote is strictly higher in
the case of a highly efficient expert compared to the case of a less efficient expert for
a specified level of effort. Because P(p1, p2, . . ., pN ) is strictly increasing with each
pi , we therefore obtain:
Lemma 2 Under transparency and opacity, the principal’s optimal re-appointment
decision is9
member i is
{
re-appointed if i is highly efficient with a probability larger than q H
dismissed if i is highly efficient with a probability lower than q H .
The respective probabilities of a member being highly efficient are determined by
Bayesian updating. They are calculated for both scenarios in the following.
4 Transparency
We begin our analysis of transparent committees by examining members’ optimal
voting behavior in the first period. Assume a committee member of type X ∈ {L , H}
has exerted effort ei1 and has received signal σ
i
1. This implies that s1 = σ i1 is correct
with probability pX (ei1) > 1/2. There are two cases in line with our assumptions
8 Of course, members’ signals are positively correlated. However, the probability of a member voting
correctly is independent of the correctness of other members’ votes because the probability of a member
receiving a correct signal is independent of whether other members have received a correct signal.
9 If the probability of i being highly efficient amounts to q H , the government is indifferent between
dismissal and re-appointment.
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about re-appointment schemes. First, the probability of re-appointment may be insen-
sitive to the correctness of the individual vote (μiT (C) = μiT (W )). According to
our tie-breaking rule, the committee member will make the decision suggested by
his signal. Second, the probability of re-appointment may be sensitive to the cor-
rectness of the individual vote, i.e. μiT (C) > μ
i
T (W ) holds. If the committee mem-
ber votes for σ i1, the probability of being re-appointed amounts to pX (e
i
1)μ
i
T (C) +
(1 − pX (ei1))μiT (W ). If the expert votes for −σ i1, then the probability of re-appoint-
ment is given by (1 − pX (ei1))μiT (C) + pX (ei1)μiT (W ). Because the expert tries to
maximize his re-appointment chances, it is strictly optimal to vote for σ i1 if
pX (ei1)μ
i
T (C) + (1 − pX (ei1))μiT (W ) > (1 − pX (ei1))μiT (C) + pX (ei1)μiT (W ).
(5)
This inequality always holds for pX (ei1) > 1/2 and μ
i
T (C) > μ
i
T (W ). Hence it is
always optimal to vote in line with one’s signal. We summarize this finding in the
following lemma:
Lemma 3 Under transparency, experts always make the decision suggested by their
signals in the first period.
Next, we analyze the optimal choice of effort in the first period. An expert i with
efficiency level X ∈ {H, L} chooses ei1 in order to maximize
B − ei1 + δ
[
pX (ei1)μ
i
T (C) + (1 − pX (ei1))μiT (W )
]
B. (6)
This yields the first-order condition10
1 = δ
[
μiT (C) − μiT (W )
]
(pX )′(ei1)B. (7)
As a consequence, the optimal level of effort under transparency is given by
e
i,X
1,T =
⎧⎨
⎩
(
(pX )′
)−1 ( 1
(μiT (C)−μiT (W ))δB
)
for μiT (C) > μ
i
T (W )
0 for μiT (C) = μiT (W ).
(8)
Equation (8) and our assumptions about pX immediately imply the following lemma:
Lemma 4 Under transparency, every expert i chooses a weakly higher level of effort
if he is highly efficient rather than less efficient. The probability of expert i choosing
a correct vote in the first period is always strictly higher if he is highly efficient rather
than less efficient.
10 Our assumption pX ′′(eit ) < 0 implies that the solution to the first-order condition always represents
a maximum.
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In the following, we turn to the optimal re-appointment scheme under transparency.
According to Lemma 2, we have to determine the probability that an expert who has
voted correctly is highly efficient. Bayes’ rule implies
κ i,H = q
H pH (ei,H1,T )
q H pH (ei,H1,T ) + q L pL(ei,L1,T )
, (9)
where we have used the fact that the probability of expert i being highly efficient and
choosing the correct vote is q H pH (ei,H1,T ). The probability of a less efficient committee
member receiving a correct signal is q L pL(ei,L1,T ). Probability κ i,H is higher than the
probability of a newly appointed candidate being highly efficient if
q H pH (ei,H1,T )
q H pH (ei,H1,T ) + q L pL(ei,L1,T )
> q H , (10)
which is equivalent to
pH (ei,H1,T ) > q
H pH (ei,H1,T ) + (1 − q H )pL(ei,L1,T ). (11)
This inequality always holds, because 0 < q H < 1 and pH (ei,H1,T ) > pL(e
i,L
1,T ), which
follows from Lemma 4. By virtue of Lemma 2, it is thus strictly optimal to re-appoint
a committee member who has voted correctly. Analogous arguments show that it is
strictly optimal to dismiss a committee member who has chosen the wrong decision.
We summarize these results in the following lemma:
Lemma 5 Under transparency, the optimal re-appointment scheme is given by
μiT (Z
i ) =
{
1 for Zi = C
0 for Zi = W. (12)
Using (8), the equilibrium level of effort under transparency is given by11
eX1,T =
(
(pX )′
)−1 ( 1
δB
)
∀X ∈ {H, L}. (13)
5 Opacity
It is obvious that under opacity experts will always vote in line with their signals in the
first period. This will increase their chances of re-election for μiO(C) > μ
i
O(W ).
12
11 As the level of effort is identical for all members of a particular type X , we do not use an additional
index i here.
12 Each individual member knows that his vote will only affect the outcome if there is a draw among the
other members. In this case, both choices are equally likely and it is optimal to vote in line with one’s signal.
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For μiO(C) = μiO(W ) this behavior is chosen in accordance with our tie-breaking
rule. What remains to be examined is the level of effort chosen by highly efficient and
less efficient experts.
For this purpose, it will be useful to introduce the set of combinations of the other
experts’ votes for which i is pivotal Cpivi :=
{
(c j ) j =i∈{0, 1}N−1|∑ j =i c j=(N−1)/2},
where we use the convention that c j = 1 stands for a correct vote of expert j
and c j = 0 for an incorrect vote. Moreover, the set of combinations of the other
experts’ votes for which a correct decision is taken irrespective of i’s vote is Ccori :={
(c j ) j =i ∈ {0, 1}N−1|∑ j =i c j ≥ (N + 1)/2}. With these sets we can express the
probability of the expert being pivotal as
χ i =
∑
(c j ) j =i ∈Cpivi
∏
j∈{1,...,N }\{i}
(
q H pH
(
e
j,H
1
)
+ q L pL
(
e
j,L
1
))c j
×
(
1 − q H pH
(
e
j,H
1
)
− q L pL
(
e
j,L
1
))1−c j
, (14)
and the probability of a correct decision being taken irrespective of i’s vote as
ψ i =
∑
(c j ) j =i ∈Ccori
∏
j∈{1,...,N }\{i}
(
q H pH
(
e
j,H
1
)
+ q L pL
(
e
j,L
1
))c j
×
(
1 − q H pH
(
e
j,H
1
)
− q L pL
(
e
j,L
1
))1−c j
. (15)
The effort level ei,X1 of expert i with efficiency level X is chosen so as to maximize
i’s expected level of utility, which is
φi,X : = B − ei,X1
+ δ
[(
ψ i+χ i pX
(
e
i,X
1
))
μiO(C) +
(
1 − ψ i−χ i pX
(
e
i,X
1
))
μiO(W )
]
B,
(16)
where we have utilized our previous result that expert i will not exert effort in the
second period (ei,X2,O = 0,∀X ∈ {H, L}). Optimization yields the first-order condition
1 = δχ i · (pX )′(ei,X1 )
[
μiO(C) − μiO(W )
]
B. (17)
Thus the optimal level of effort under opacity is
e
i,X
1,O =
⎧⎨
⎩
(
(pX )′
)−1 ( 1
(μiO (C)−μiO (W ))χ i δB
)
for χ i (μiO(C) − μiO(W )) > 0
0 for χ i (μiO(C) − μiO(W )) = 0.
(18)
Our assumptions about pX (.) again imply:
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Lemma 6 Under opacity, each expert i chooses a weakly higher level of effort if he is
highly efficient rather than less efficient. His probability of obtaining a correct signal
is strictly higher if he is highly efficient rather than less efficient.
Because in the first period highly efficient experts are always more likely to vote
correctly compared to less efficient committee members, a committee that has made
a correct decision is always strictly more likely to arrive at a correct decision in the
second period than a newly appointed committee. Similarly a committee that has made
a wrong decision is always strictly less likely to arrive at a correct decision in the sec-
ond period than a newly appointed committee. These findings imply the next lemma,
which is shown formally in Appendix A:
Lemma 7 Under opacity, the principal’s optimal re-appointment scheme is given by
μiO(Z) =
{
1 for Z = C
0 for Z = W. (19)
Now the member i’s level of effort in an equilibrium under opacity can be written as
e
i,X
1,O =
(
(pX )′
)−1 ( 1
χ iδB
)
. (20)
Condition (20) holds for all committee members i and χ i depends on the effort levels
of all other members. In Appendix B we show
Lemma 8 The system of 2N equations represented by (20) for i ∈ {1, . . ., N } and
X ∈ {H, L} always has a solution.
While the solution is not unique in general, all of our findings will hold independently
of which equilibrium is chosen.
6 Comparison of transparency and opacity
6.1 The first period
Finally, we compare the principal’s utility under transparency and under opacity. Under
transparency, all highly efficient experts will choose identical effort levels eH1,T in the
first period. Their vote is correct with probability pH (eH1,T ). A less efficient expert’s
likelihood of choosing the correct vote is pL(eL1,T ). Because the prior probability of
a member being highly efficient is q H , the probability of an expert making a correct
decision in the first period is given by
ρ1,T := q H pH (eH1,T ) + (1 − q H )pL(eL1,T ). (21)
Hence the principal’s expected utility in the first period is
u P1,T = P(ρ1,T , ρ1,T , . . ., ρ1,T ). (22)
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Under opacity, the probability of an individual expert i ∈ {1, . . ., N } voting correctly
in the first period is given by
ρi1,O := q H pH (ei,H1,O) + (1 − q H )pL(ei,L1,O). (23)
Notice that ρi1,O may be different across experts, whereas ρ1,T is always identical for
all experts. This is a consequence of the fact that under opacity asymmetric equilibria
may exist where different members with the same level of efficiency choose different
effort levels.
With the help of ρi1,O , the principal’s expected utility under opacity can be stated
as
u P1,O = P(ρ11,O , ρ21,O , . . ., ρN1,O). (24)
Because of χ i < 1, equations (13) and (20) yield eX1,T > ei,X1,O∀i ∈ {1, . . ., N }.
Together with the observation that pX (.) is a strictly monotonically increasing func-
tion this implies ρ1,T > ρi1,O∀i ∈ {1, . . ., N }. Intuitively, transparency leads to higher
effort levels of all members, irrespective of the equilibrium chosen under opacity. Thus
each member votes for the correct option with higher probability than under opacity. As
mentioned above, probability P(p1, p2, . . ., pN ) is strictly monotonically increasing
in all of its arguments. This yields the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The principal’s first-period utility is always higher under transparency
than under opacity, i.e. u P1,T > u P1,O.
6.2 The second period
In the second period, it appears plausible that the principal’s utility will be higher under
transparency. This is suggested by the observation that transparency may improve the
principal’s ability to distinguish highly efficient from somewhat less efficient com-
mittee members. However, this is not always the case, as transparency might cause
a convergence of the signal qualities for highly efficient and less efficient members.
This countervailing effect may reduce the principal’s ability to distinguish between
highly efficient and less efficient members.
In order to make this more precise, we need to introduce additional notation.
Suppose that experts could be rewarded for making correct decisions in a particu-
lar period. We use r ∈ [0, δB] to denote this reward in utility units. Moreover, we
introduce eH (r) = ((pH )′)−1 ( 1
r
)
and eL(r) = ((pL)′)−1 ( 1
r
)
to denote the optimal
choice of high and low ability types respectively. Now we are in a position to define
the following property:
Definition 1 The functions pH (e) and pL(e) have the property of non-decreasing
quality differences (NDQD) if the following condition holds for all r ∈ [0, δB]:
d
(
pH (eH (r)) − pL(eL(r)))
d r
≥ 0. (25)
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Intuitively, this property ensures that a marginal increase in the rewards for correct
decisions will increase the signal quality gap between highly efficient and less efficient
members.
Condition (25) can be rewritten as d pH (eH (r))d r ≥ d p
L (eL (r))
d r . NDQD is stronger
than our assumption pH ′(e) ≥ pL ′(e)∀e ∈ [0, E[, because of eH (r) ≥ eL(r) and the
concavity of pH (e).
NDQD is fulfilled, for example, if pH (e) = pL(e) + c (c > 0) holds in addi-
tion to our assumptions. This is a consequence of the fact that for this specification
eH (r) = eL(r) holds for all r ∈ [0, δB].13
In Appendix C we show
Proposition 2 If the functions pH (e) and pL(e) satisfy NDQD, then the principal’s
second-period utility is always higher under transparency than under opacity, i.e.
u P2,T > u
P
2,O.
If NDQD does not hold, then it is conceivable that the principal’s utility in the second
period is higher under opacity. Under transparency, the increased effort might lead to
almost identical signal qualities in the first period, which makes it virtually impossible
for the principal to distinguish highly efficient from less efficient experts.
In the next proposition, we show that this is indeed possible.
Proposition 3 If NDQD does not hold, then the principal’s utility in the second period
may be higher under opacity.
Proposition 3 is proved by an example, which is given in Appendix D. The basic idea
underlying the example is that both functions pH (e) and pL(e) are approximately
linear with the first derivative of pH (e) only marginally larger than the one of pL(e).
Parameters are chosen in a way such that, under transparency, both types of agents
choose an effort level that is approximately identical to the maximum possible effort
level E . If pL(e) and pH (e) are almost identical in this case, both types will be almost
indistinguishable for the principal. In addition, a knife-edge case for B is chosen such
that, under opacity, it is still beneficial for the high-efficiency type to exert the maxi-
mum level of effort E . However, for the low-efficiency type this is just not worthwhile.
Because pL(e) is almost linear, this implies that e ≈ 0 is selected by this type. As a
consequence, both types behave very differently under opacity.
6.3 Utility of committee members
It is also interesting to consider whether committee members would find transpar-
ency desirable. A transparency requirement affects committee members’ utilities
in two ways. First, transparency induces higher effort in the first period, which is
detrimental from the members’ point of view. Second, it affects the probability of their
being re-appointed. It is conceivable that in some cases transparency will increase this
probability. However, for large committees one can reach a clear-cut finding:
13 To give another example, we note that pX (e) = aX eα + bX (X ∈ {H, L}) satisfies the assumptions
laid out in Sect. 2 for α ∈]0, 1[, 0 < aL ≤ aH ≤ min
{
1−bH
Eα ,
E1−α
αδB
}
and 0 < bL < bH < 1. It is
straightforward but tedious to show that NDQD always holds in this case.
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Proposition 4 For sufficiently large committees, transparency is always detrimental
to committee members.
This follows from the fact that for sufficiently large committees the probability of a
correct decision being reached and hence of each member being re-appointed con-
verges to one under opacity. This is a consequence of the Condorcet Jury Theorem,
which can be applied in our case because of our assumption that pH (0) > pL(0) > 12 .
This condition implies that each individual committee member is always strictly more
likely to choose the correct vote than the wrong vote, even if he exerts no effort. Under
transparency, the probability of re-appointment does not depend on committee size
and is given by pX (eX1,T ), which is strictly smaller than one. Our finding may explain
why many monetary policy committees have adopted transparent decision-making
only as a consequence of external pressure.14
7 Unknown own ability
Up to now, we have assumed that experts know their own ability. However, it is
also conceivable that experts do not have superior information about their own effi-
ciency. For example, agents entering a monetary policy committee may not be familiar
with the tasks accomplished by this committee and thus may be unsure about their
ability regarding these tasks. The case of unknown own ability is considered in this
section.15
If experts do not know their own abilities, each expert estimates his probability of
being highly efficient to be q H and the probability of his being less efficient to be q L .
It will be useful to introduce
pU A(e) := q H pH (e) + q L pL(e), (26)
which gives the probability of an expert of unknown ability (U A) receiving a correct
signal, given that he has chosen effort e. Applying the assumptions regarding pL(.)
and pH (.), it is readily verified that pU A(e) satisfies
∂pU A
∂eit
(eit ) > 0
∂2 pU A
∂(eit )
2 (e
i
t ) < 0 ∀eit ∈ [0, E[,
lim
eit →E
∂pU A
∂eit
(eit ) <
1
δB
lim
eit →0
∂pU A
∂eit
(eit ) = ∞ ∀eit ∈ [0, E[.
14 If highly efficient committee members are aiming at attractive future positions, they may advocate
transparency, which gives them a platform to improve the public perception of their competence.
15 It will be immaterial to our findings whether committee members learn their ability at the end of the first
period or not.
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The equilibrium under transparency can be characterized as follows:
Lemma 9 Under transparency, the optimal re-appointment scheme if experts do not
know their own ability is
μ
i,U A
T (Z
i ) =
{
1 for Zi = C
0 for Zi = W. (27)
All experts vote in line with their private signals and the equilibrium level of effort in
the first period is
eU A1,T =
((
pU A
)′)−1 ( 1
δB
)
. (28)
The proof is completely analogous to the proofs for transparency and known ability.
It is therefore omitted. Similarly, for opacity we obtain
Lemma 10 Under opacity, the optimal re-appointment scheme if experts do not know
their own ability is
μ
i,U A
O (Z) =
{
1 for Z = C
0 for Z = W. (29)
All experts vote in line with their private signals and their equilibrium levels of effort
in the first period are
e
i,U A
1,O =
((
pU A
)′)−1 ( 1
χ i,U AδB
)
, (30)
where χ i,U A is the probability of member i being pivotal. We note that χ i,U A < 1
implies eU A1,T > e
i,U A
1,O . Consequently, pU A(e
U A
1,T ) > p
U A(ei,U A1,O )∀i ∈ {1, . . ., N }. Thus
the probability of an individual member choosing a correct vote is larger under trans-
parency compared to opacity. In the next proposition we compare the principal’s utility
under transparency and opacity if experts do not know their own ability.
Proposition 5 With unknown own ability of experts, the principal’s first-period utility
is always higher under transparency than under opacity, i.e. u P,U A1,T > u
P,U A
1,O .
Proof The probability of a correct decision being reached, P(p1, p2, . . ., pN ), is a
strictly increasing function of pi∀i ∈ {1, . . ., N }. This implies
u
P,U A
1,T = P
(
pU A(eU A1,T ), p
U A(eU A1,T ), . . ., p
U A(eU A1,T )
)
> P
(
pU A(e1,U A1,O ), p
U A(e2,U A1,O ), . . ., p
U A(eN ,U A1,O )
)
= u P,U A1,O .
unionsq
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For experts who know their own ability, we have shown that the principal’s second-
period utility is higher under transparency if NDQD, i.e. (25), holds. For unknown
ability of experts, the respective condition is
d
(
pH (eU A(r)) − pL(eU A(r)))
d r
≥ 0, (31)
where eU A(r) := ((pU A)′)−1 ( 1
r
)
. Because of assumption ∂p
H
∂eit
(eit ) ≥ ∂p
L
∂eit
(eit ) ∀eit ∈
[0, E[ and eU A ′(r) = − 1
r2 pU A ′′(eU A(r)) > 0 ∀r ∈ [0, δB], Condition (31) always
holds. This immediately implies
Proposition 6 With unknown ability, the principal’s second-period utility is always
higher under transparency than under opacity, i.e. u P,U A2,T > u
P,U A
2,O .
Intuitively, the proposition can be explained in the following way. Under opacity, each
expert i chooses an effort level ei,U A1,O . Transparency increases this effort level to e
U A
1,T ,
which makes the probability of a highly efficient expert voting correctly increase more
strongly than the respective probability for a less efficient expert. Consequently, the
principal can distinguish more easily between highly efficient and less efficient experts,
which unambiguously results in higher second-period utility. To sum up, transparency
is always beneficial to the principal in both periods if experts do not know their own
ability.
8 Robustness and extensions
In this section we discuss several issues related to the robustness of our findings and
possible extensions to our model. In particular, we focus on the role of the assumption
(pH )′(e) ≥ (pL)′(e), the possibility of information exchange in pre-meetings, the
case where the state of the world cannot be observed by the principal, and the size of
committees.
Role of the assumption (pH)′(e) ≥ (pL)′(e)
It is instructive to discuss the role of the assumption (pH )′(e) ≥ (pL)′(e). It ensures
that highly efficient members choose higher levels of effort than less efficient ones
(see, for example, the first part of Lemma 4), which together with the assumption
pH (e) > pL(e) guarantees that highly efficient members are more likely to vote for
the correct option than less efficient members. This fact makes it optimal for the prin-
cipal to re-appoint members who have voted correctly and to dismiss those who have
supported the wrong option. One might argue that (pH )′(e) < (pL)′(e) is also plau-
sible at least at some effort levels. For example, it is conceivable that highly efficient
members know some easy-to-learn facts without exerting effort. Then, by learning
these facts, improving the signal quality would be easier for less efficient members
than highly efficient ones.
In the next proposition, we relax the assumption (pH )′(e) ≥ (pL)′(e).
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Proposition 7 Suppose we replace assumption (pH )′(e) ≥ (pL)′(e) by
pH (((pH )′)−1(1/r)) > pL(((pL)′)−1(1/r))∀r > 0. (32)
Then all results of Propositions 1 to 4 continue to hold.
The proof follows from the observation that (32) guarantees that highly efficient mem-
bers are more likely to choose the correct option in equilibrium in the first period than
less efficient members.
In the case where pH (((pH )′)−1(1/r)) > pL(((pL)′)−1(1/r)) is violated for some
r , highly competent members may be less likely to vote correctly than less efficient
members when both types choose the effort levels in (13) or (20) respectively. As
a consequence, the principal’s re-appointment scheme identified in this paper would
not be optimal. In Appendix E, we consider such an example. Under transparency,
the principal’s equilibrium re-appointment scheme corresponds to a mixed strategy,
where members who have voted for the wrong option are definitely dismissed and
members who have voted for the correct option are re-appointed with positive prob-
ability. Both types of members have identical probabilities of voting for the correct
option under transparency (otherwise randomizing would not be optimal for the prin-
cipal). As a result, the principal cannot improve the composition of the committee by
her re-appointment decision under transparency. Due to this effect the principal has
higher second-period utility under opacity compared to transparency. However, in our
example the gains created by transparency in the first period outweigh these losses
and the principal receives higher overall utility under transparency.
Pre-meetings
One interesting extension to our model would incorporate the possibility of members
exchanging information in private before the official meeting.16 More specifically,
suppose that members could exchange messages about their signals and possibly also
about their abilities before voting takes place.17 Moreover, suppose that this exchange
of messages could not be observed by the principal and that all messages were sent
simultaneously. Under both transparency and opacity, sending completely uninforma-
tive messages would correspond to an equilibrium. Given that all members assume
that messages contain no information, it is not profitable for an individual agent to
deviate and send a message that is correlated with his signal. For these equilibria, all
of our findings would carry over to a scenario with pre-meetings.
However, it is conceivable that additional equilibria exist. Notably under opac-
ity, committee members’ interests are aligned as the principal can only observe the
outcome of the voting. A higher probability of a correct outcome thus increases the re-
appointment chances for all members in unison. By exchanging information about
their signals, effort levels, and abilities, members may enhance the efficiency of
16 Models of voting with prior deliberation have been examined by Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006),
Gerardi and Yariv (2007), Meirowitz (2007), and Swank et al. (2006).
17 We consider pre-meetings in the first period only, as even very small costs incurred by attending a
pre-meeting would induce members to abstain from such a meeting in the second period.
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information aggregation in the first period, which is beneficial to all of them. This
improvement in the efficiency of information aggregation would enable them to pre-
vent being dismissed even for a comparably low aggregate level of their competence.
Thus the principal would be less able to improve the composition of the commit-
tee by dismissing its members at the beginning of the second period, and hence the
probability of a correct decision in the second period would decrease.
Under transparency, there are no incentives to reveal private information truth-
fully. Given the re-appointment scheme in our paper, revealing private signals and
thus improving the precision of information for the other members does not enhance
a member’s re-appointment chances but only benefits the recipients of the informa-
tion. In addition, we note that the principal would take the possibility of information
exchange into account when deciding whether or not to re-appoint members. Then
voting for the wrong option in line with one’s colleagues may indicate a particularly
low level of competence whereas deviating from the mainstream opinion may reveal
an exceptionally high level of competence if that decision turns out to be correct.
Hence members may benefit from mistakes of their colleagues, which severely limits
the usefulness of pre-vote communication.18
To sum up, truthful exchange of information is more likely to represent an equilib-
rium behavior under opacity. Under opacity, the principal’s utility would be higher in
the first period but lower in the second period in an equilibrium with truthful exchange
of information over and against an equilibrium without informative messages. Addi-
tionally, the incentives to exert effort in the first period would remain lower under
opacity over and against transparency.
State of the world unobserved by the principal
If the state of the world were unobserved by the principal when she has to re-appoint
members, she would not be able to gain any information about members’ levels of
competence under opacity. Thus re-appointment would be independent of the com-
mittee members’ effort levels. Then opacity would lead to the lowest possible levels
of effort for all committee members and in turn to a low level of utility for the prin-
cipal in both periods. Under transparency, the principal may attempt to infer infor-
mation about members’ abilities from the pattern of votes. It is plausible that all
members would vote in line with their signals. Then it would be optimal for the
government to re-appoint those members who share the opinion of the majority but
to dismiss the other members because the option chosen by the majority would be
more likely to be correct than the other option. In such a scenario, it would be ben-
eficial to show a united front, which might make it attractive to share information in
pre-meetings.19
18 See Hahn (2008), who shows in a model of sequential voting without information acquisition that com-
mittee members may benefit from wrong decisions of their colleagues. As a consequence, they may not
reveal private information truthfully.
19 Visser and Swank (2007) argue that committee members may want to conceal disagreement when all
highly efficient members’ signals are perfectly correlated. In this case, disagreement signals low levels of
ability.
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We conclude that, if the state of the world could not be observed by the princi-
pal when she makes her re-appointment decisions, opacity would lead to the lowest
possible level of welfare. Hence transparency leads to weakly superior results.
Optimal committee size
Finally we comment on the optimal size of the committee under both transparency
regimes. Suppose the principal incurred a certain cost when enlarging the committee,
e.g. because she would have to pay a fixed remuneration to experts. Under opacity,
an additional member strengthens the other members’ free-riding incentives. This
effect reduces the gains an additional committee member may imply for the principal.
Under transparency, this effect is not present because a member’s vote can be observed
directly. As a consequence, the committee size that is optimal from the principal’s per-
spective tends to be higher under transparency compared to opacity.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that transparency leads to higher intensity of information
collection on the part of committee members, because their individual voting behavior
can be observed and they want to appear as competent individuals in order to remain in
office. Due to the higher probability of a correct outcome, the principal’s first-period
utility is always higher under transparency than under opacity. In the second period,
the principal’s utility is also higher under transparency, unless transparency induces
a strong convergence in the signal qualities of highly efficient and less efficient com-
mittee members. Then the principal’s ability to identify and re-appoint highly efficient
members is diminished. If experts do not know their own ability, transparency makes
the principal always better off in the second period.
Transparency harms committee members because it forces them to exert more effort.
For sufficiently large committees, we have shown that transparency also reduces com-
mittee members’ re-appointment prospects. This may explain why committee mem-
bers are sometimes reluctant to publish voting records.
If we take a broader view on whether transparency in committees is desirable, our
paper may help to draw a sharper line. If prior investment in knowledge acquisition
by committee members is crucial, transparency is advisable. This may be the case in
standing expert committees that face heterogeneous and varying tasks. For instance,
the council of economic advisers to the Ministry of Economic Affairs in Germany
has recently adopted more transparent rules to foster information acquisition.20 For
other committees, investments into information acquisition are less important, but the
abilities of members play an important role. Examples include academic recruiting
committees and juries. Then opacity may be justified in light of the literature discussed
in the introduction, which identifies distortionary behavioral effects of transparency.
20 Source: private communication.
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Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 7
In the following we analyze under which circumstances it is optimal for the principal
to re-appoint or dismiss a particular member i ∈ {1, . . ., N } under opacity. According
to Lemma 2, it is optimal for the principal to re-appoint member i after the first period
if the probability of his being highly efficient is strictly higher than q H . Conversely it
is optimal for the principal to dismiss member i if the probability of his being highly
efficient is strictly lower than q H .
Now suppose that the decision of the committee has been correct in the first period
(C). Then the probability of high efficiency (X = H ) of member i is
Pr(X = H |C) = Pr
(
(X = H) ∧ C)
Pr(C)
= Pr(C |X = H) Pr(X = H)
Pr(C)
= Pr(C |X = H)
Pr(C)
· q H
= Pr(C |X = H)
q H Pr(C |X = H) + (1 − q H ) Pr(C |X = L) · q
H
= 1
q H + (1 − q H ) Pr(C|X=L)Pr(C|X=H)
· q H
> q H .
Here we have used Pr(C |X = L) < Pr(C |X = H), which follows from the fact that
member i is pivotal with strictly positive probability in the first period and that a highly
efficient member is always strictly more likely to vote correctly than a less efficient
member (see Lemma 6). As a consequence, it is optimal to re-appoint member i if the
decision in the first period has been correct.
Analogously one can show Pr(X = H |W ) < q H , where W denotes a wrong
decision in the first period. This implies that it is optimal for the principal to dismiss
member i in this case. unionsq
B Proof of Lemma 8
Consider the hypothetical 2N -player normal-form game with players (i, X) ∈
{1, . . ., N } × {H, L}, strategies ei,X1 ∈ [0, E], and payoff functions φi,X . The
second derivative of the payoff function amounts to
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∂2φi,X
∂(e
i,X
1 )
2
= δχ i · (pX )′′(ei,X1 )
[
μiO(C) − μiO(W )
]
B < 0. (33)
Hence φi,X is a strictly concave function of ei,X1 . Moreover, φi,X is a continuous func-
tion of the other players’ effort choices, because χ i is a continuous function of the
other players’ effort choices.21 Thus the hypothetical game has an equilibrium in pure
strategies (see Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 34); the theorem goes
back to Debreu (1952), Fan (1952), and Glicksberg (1952)). unionsq
C Proof of Proposition 2
C.1 Step 1
We divide the proof into three steps. In the first step we will introduce some notation
that will be useful for the remainder of the analysis. Now we deal with the probabil-
ity of a correct outcome in the second period as a function of the number of highly
efficient members. Recall that all members exert no effort in the second period. Then
this probability can be written as
πn = P
(
pH (0), . . ., pH (0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
, pL(0), . . ., pL(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
N − n times
)
.
Because P(p1, . . ., pN ) is strictly increasing in all of its arguments, it is obvious that
πn is a strictly increasing function of n. Intuitively, the more highly efficient mem-
bers there are, the higher is the probability of a correct decision in the second period,
because highly efficient members vote correctly with probability pH (0), whereas less
efficient members only make a correct decision with probability pL(0) < pH (0).
For given numbers of highly efficient and less efficient members the principal’s
utility in the second period is independent of the transparency regime. However, the
distribution of highly efficient and less efficient members will be different under trans-
parency and opacity. Therefore it is necessary to analyze this distribution under both
scenarios. We use ξR,n to denote the probability of n members being highly efficient
in the second period under regime R ∈ {T, O}.
We derive ξT,n first. In the second period, the probability of an individual expert
being highly efficient under transparency is
Q H2,T := q H pH (eH1,T ) +
{
q H
[
1 − pH (eH1,T )
]
+ (1 − q H )
[
1 − pL(eL1,T )
]}
q H .
(34)
The first summand gives the probability of the member in the first period being highly
efficient and choosing the correct vote, which entails re-appointment. The second
21 Note that χ i is a continuous function of the probabilities of individual members choosing a particular
vote, which in turn are continuous functions of the other players’ effort choices.
123
448 H. Gersbach, V. Hahn
summand corresponds to the eventuality that an expert may choose a wrong vote and
be replaced by a highly efficient expert. Using Q H2,T , we can write ξT,n as
ξT,n =
(
N
n
)(
Q H2,T
)n (
1 − Q H2,T
)N−n
. (35)
The expression for the respective probability under opacity, ξO,n , is much more com-
plex, because the probability of an individual committee member being highly effi-
cient depends on the outcome of the voting and thus on the behavior of all committee
members rather than the individual’s behavior alone. Thus we refrain from stating it
explicitly.
The principal’s expected utility in the second period under regime R ∈ {T, O} can
be expressed as
u P2,R =
N∑
n=0
ξR,nπn . (36)
The claim of the proposition can be written as
N∑
n=0
ξT,nπn = u P2,T > u P2,O =
N∑
n=0
ξO,nπn . (37)
Now we introduce the hypothetical distribution one would obtain under transpar-
ency in the second period if all members chose the effort levels optimal under opacity
(ei,X1,O ) in the first period. The respective probability mass function will be denoted by
ξ˜T,n .
In step 2 we will show
∑N
n=0 ξT,nπn ≥
∑N
n=0 ξ˜T,nπn . In step 3 we will derive∑N
n=0 ξ˜T,nπn >
∑N
n=0 ξO,nπn . Combining steps 2 and 3 delivers (37).
C.2 Step 2
In this step we show
∑N
n=0 ξT,nπn ≥
∑N
n=0 ξ˜T,nπn . We have already noted that πn
is strictly increasing in n. Thus it is sufficient to show that the distribution with the
probability mass function ξT,n weakly first-order stochastically dominates the one that
is characterized by ξ˜T,n .
We now define Q˜i,H2,T as
Q˜i,H2,T := q H pH (ei,H1,O) +
{
q H
[
1 − pH (ei,H1,O)
]
+ (1 − q H )
[
1 − pL(ei,L1,O)
]}
q H .
(38)
This expression is identical to Q H2,T as defined in Equation (34) except for the fact
that we have replaced the effort levels under transparency by the effort levels under
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opacity. Thus Q˜i,H2,T corresponds to the probability under transparency of an individual
member being highly efficient in the second period assuming that all members have
chosen the effort levels they would find optimal under opacity in the first period and
that the principal applies the re-appointment scheme specified in Lemma 5.
Recall that ξT,n is the probability of n members being highly efficient if the prob-
ability of an individual member being highly efficient is probability Q H2,T . Similarly,
ξ˜T,n is the probability of n members being highly efficient if the probability of each
member i being highly efficient amounts to Q˜i,H2,T .
Consequently, the distribution characterized by the probability mass function
ξT,n weakly first-order stochastically dominates the distribution described by ξ˜T,n
if Q H2,T ≥ Q˜i,H2,T ∀i ∈ {1, . . ., N }, which means that the individual probability of being
highly efficient under transparency in the second period is higher for each mem-
ber if all members choose the effort levels optimal under transparency rather than
those optimal under opacity. This is shown in the following. Using (34) and (38),
we obtain
Q H2,T − Q˜i,H2,T = q H
(
pH (eH1,T ) − pH (ei,H1,O )
)
−
{
q H
[
pH (eH1,T ) − pH (ei,H1,O )
]
+ (1 − q H )
[
pL (eL1,T ) − pL (ei,L1,O )
]}
q H
= q H (1 − q H )
[
pH (eH1,T ) − pH (ei,H1,O ) −
(
pL (eL1,T ) − pL (ei,L1,O )
)]
.
This expression is weakly positive if
pH (eH1,T ) − pL(eL1,T ) −
(
pH (ei,H1,O) − pL(ei,L1,O)
)
≥ 0. (39)
This condition is fulfilled if NDQD holds. Thus ∑Nn=0 ξT,nπn ≥ ∑Nn=0 ξ˜T,nπn
holds.
C.3 Step 3
Finally, we show
∑N
n=0 ξ˜T,nπn >
∑N
n=0 ξO,nπn . Let us consider the transparency
scenario but assume that all members choose the effort levels that correspond to those
under opacity. It is straightforward to see that Lemma 5 can also be applied to the
case where members choose ei,X1,O rather than eX1,T . Hence it is strictly optimal for the
principal to re-appoint a member who has chosen the correct decision and to dismiss
a member who has voted for the wrong decision. In particular, this behavior is strictly
preferred to the behavior where the principal re-appoints all members if and only if the
overall decision has been correct. Thus
∑N
n=0 ξ˜T,nπn represents the maximum level
of welfare and
∑N
n=0 ξ˜T,nπn >
∑N
n=0 ξO,nπn .
We have already noted that steps 2 and 3 jointly guarantee the proposition. unionsq
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D Example where NDQD is violated
In the following we construct an example where NDQD is violated and opacity leads
to a higher utility of the principal in the second period. Suppose N = 3, E = 1,
qH = 1/2, and
pH (e) = 1
2
+ ε +
(
1
2
− ε
)
e,
pL(e) = 1
2
+
(
1
2
− ε
)
e,
where ε > ε. It is clear that these functions do not satisfy two of the constraints intro-
duced before, as they are not strictly concave and limeit →0
∂pX
∂eit
(eit ) = ∞ ∀X ∈ {H, L}
does not hold.22 However, it is always possible to find functions that are arbitrarily
close to pH (e) and pL(e) and satisfy these assumptions.
Let us use χ˜ to denote the probability of an individual member being pivotal,
conditional on highly efficient colleagues voting for the correct option with probabil-
ity one and less efficient ones with probability one half. Now suppose that B is the
unique solution to
1
χ˜δB
= 1
2
(
(pL)′(e) + (pH )′(e)
)
= 1
2
− 1
2
(
ε + ε)
Hence (pL)′(e) = (1/2 − ε) < 1/(χ˜δB) < (1/2 − ε) = (pH )′(e). This condition
implies that under opacity highly efficient members choose the maximum effort of
one, whereas less efficient members choose no effort at all. Under transparency, both
types choose the maximum effort; this follows from χ˜ < 1. Moreover, suppose that
ε and ε with (ε < ε) are extremely small such that pL(1) ≈ pH (1) = 1. Impor-
tantly, both types of members have approximately the same probability of choosing
the correct option under transparency in the first period.
It is plausible (and can also be verified formally)23 that for this particular constella-
tion the principal cannot improve the composition of the committee under transparency
by selecting individual members because both types have probabilities of voting cor-
rectly that are arbitrarily close to one another. By contrast, under opacity moderate
improvements of the committee composition are feasible, which lead to a somewhat
higher probability of a correct decision in the second period over and against trans-
parency. unionsq
22 In a similar vein, it is not clear whether lim
eit →1
∂pX
∂eit
(eit ) < 1/(δB)∀X ∈ {H, L}. Moreover, pL (0) >
1/2 does not hold strictly.
23 A proof is available upon request.
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E Example where pH(((pH)′)−1(1/r)) > pL(((pL)′)−1(1/r)) is violated
Suppose qH = 1/2, E = 1, δ = 1, B = 4, and
pH (e) = 3
4
+ 1
4
√
e,
pL(e) = 1
2
+ 1
2
√
e.
Then the first derivatives of pH (e) and pL(e) are
(pH )′(e) = 1
8
1√
e
,
(pL)′(e) = 1
4
1√
e
.
Consequently, pH (e) > pL(e) ∀e < 1 and (pH )′(e) < (pL)′(e) ∀e ≤ 1. Suppose,
for the moment, that the principal rewarded correct decisions with a payment of r .
Then the optimal effort levels eH and eL can be computed as follows:
1
r
= (pH )′(e) = 18 1√eH ,
1
r
= (pL)′(e) = 14 1√eL
Solving for eH and eL yields eH = (r/8)2 and eL = (r/4)2. Inserting these
values into pH (e) and pL(e), we obtain pH (eH ) = 3/4 + (1/4) · (r/8)2 and
pL(eL) = 1/2 + (1/2) · (r/4)2. Under the assumption that the principal chooses
the re-appointment scheme from Lemma 5 under transparency, the optimal behav-
ior of agents can be computed by inserting r = 4 into these equations, which gives
pH (eH ) = 7/8 and pL(eL) = 1. Consequently, pL(eL) > pH (eH ), or, equivalently
pH (((pH )′)−1(1/r)) < pL((pL)′(1/r)) for r = 4. This implies that the re-appoint-
ment scheme from Lemma 5 is not optimal, as the principal would prefer to dismiss
members who have chosen the correct option and re-appoint the other members.
Now let us consider the following candidate equilibrium under transparency: e˜H =
1/9, e˜L = 4/9, μ(C) = 2/3, and μ(W ) = 0. By setting r = δB(μ(C) − μ(W )) =
8/3, it is straightforward to demonstrate that (pL)′(˜eL) = (pH )′(˜eH ) = 3/8 = 1/r
holds, which implies that both types of members cannot profitably deviate. In addition,
randomizing is optimal for the principal because pL (˜eL) = pH (˜eH ) = 5/6. Hence
the proposed equilibrium actually exists under transparency.
Under opacity, the equilibrium considered in the paper exists, as can be derived
easily.24 The effort levels are eˆH ≈ 0.145 and eˆL ≈ 0.036, which implies pH (eˆH ) ≈
0.798, pL (eˆL) ≈ 0.690, and χ ≈ 0.381.
24 Detailed computations are available upon request.
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Hence the probability of choosing the correct option is higher for both types under
transparency over and against opacity (pL (˜eL) = 5/6 > pH (eˆH ) ≈ 0.798 and
pL (˜eL) = 5/6 > pL(eˆL) ≈ 0.690). As a result, the principal benefits from transpar-
ency in the first period. Because both types have identical probabilities of choosing
the correct option in the first period under transparency, it is impossible to improve the
committee by re-appointing or dismissing members. By contrast, moderate improve-
ments of the committee composition are feasible under opacity, where highly efficient
members have a strictly higher probability of voting for the correct option in the first
period than their less efficient colleagues. This implies that the principal is harmed
by transparency in the second period. It can be shown that the gains from opacity in
the second period do not outweigh the losses in the first period. Hence the principal
prefers transparency. unionsq
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